Reshaping the Raiders
The 2nd Raiders boarded a transport on 15 December and returned to Camp
Gung Ho on Espiritu Santo. There they recuperated in pyramidal tents in
a coconut grove along the banks of a river. The camp and the chow were
Spartan, and the only relief came when a ship took the battalion to New
February 1943 for two weeks of liberty. The 1st Raiders had returned to
Camp Bailey in New Caledonia in October 1942. Their living conditions
were similar, except for a slightly better hillside site looking over
a river. They spent a month in New Zealand over the Christmas holidays.
These were no longer the only raider battalions in the Marine Corps. Admiral
Turner had tried to force each Marine regiment to convert one battalion
to a raider organization, but General Holcomb, with an assist from Nimitz,
put a stop to that interference in the Corps' internal affairs. However,
Commandant did authorize the creation of two additional battalions of
raiders. The 3d Raiders came into being on Samoa on 20 September 1942.
Their commander was Lieutenant Colonel Harry B. "Harry the Horse"
Liversedge, a former enlisted Marine and a shotputter in the 1920 and
1924 Olympics. The battalion drew on volunteers from the many Marine units
in Samoa, and also received small contingents from the 1st and 2nd Raiders.
The Corps activated the 4th Raider Battalion in Southern California on
23 October 1942. Major Roosevelt commanded this new unit. The 3rd and
4th Raiders both arrived in Espiritu Santo in February 1943.
There as yet existed no common raider table of organization. Carlson
retained his six companies of two rifle platoons and a weapons platoon.
Griffith adopted the fire team concept, but added a fourth man to each
team and retained the four rifle companies and a weapons company established
by Edson. Roosevelt's battalion had four rifle companies plus a Demolition
and Engineer Company.
On the anniversary of the creation of the 2nd Raiders, Carlson addressed
his men in a "Gung Ho meeting. He issued a press release later to
publicize his words. In addition to announcing his decision to establish
Marine Raider Organization Day, he reviewed the battalion's first year
of existence. He noted that his morale had been "low" at times,
as the officers and men struggled to learn and implement the philosophy
of "Gung Ho" In his mind, the tactical successes of the outfit
were less significant than the way in which
he had molded it. "Makin brought the story of our methods of living
and training to the world. Perhaps this fact was of even greater importance
than the material gains of the raid." However, the days of Carlson's
influence on the raiders were numbered.
On 15-March 1943 the Marine Corps created the 1st Raider Regiment and
gave it control of all four battalions. Liversedge, now a colonel, took
charge of the new organization. A week later, Lieutenant
Colonel Alan Shapley took over command of the 2nd Raiders. He was
an orthodox line officer who had earned a Navy Cross on board the Arizona
(BB 39) on 7 December 1941. He
thought the Makin Raid had been a "fiasco" and he had no interest
in "Gung Ho." Shapley wasted no time in turning the unit into
"a regular battalion" Carlson temporarily became the regimental
executive Officer, but served there only briefly before entering the hospital
weak from malaria and jaundice. Soon thereafter he was on his way stateside.
A month later Lieutenant Colonel Michael S. Currin, another officer with
more orthodox views, took command of the 4th Raiders from Roosevelt.
The regiment enforced a common organization among the battalions. The
result was a mixture of Edson and Carlson's ideas. Carlson bequeathed
his fire team and squad to the raiders (and later to the Corps as a whole).
But each battalion now had a weapons company, and four rifle companies
composed of a
weapons platoon and three rifle platoons. Edson's other imprint was the
concept of a highly trained, lightly equipped force using conventional
tactics to accomplish special missions or to fill in for a line battalion.
The 1st Raider Regiment was no guerrilla outfit. Given the changing thrust
of the Pacific war, the choice was a wise one. In the future the Marines
would be attacking Japanese forces holed up in tight perimeters or on
small islands. Guerrilla tactics provided no answer to the problem of
overcoming these strong defensive positions.